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Summary
After only two years of deployment, the UN Mission 
in the Central African Republic and Chad (MINUR-
CAT) will, at the request of the Government of Chad, 
start its drawdown and exit by 31 December this 
year. MINURCAT will hand over its main tasks to Chad 
and the UN agencies present. These responsibilities 
include security of refugees, IDPs and humanitar-
ian workers in eastern Chad, and continued sup-
port to the 850-strong Chadian police/gendarme 
force, the Détachment Intégré de Securité (DIS), es-
tablished to provide physical protection in eastern 
Chad, so far trained and mentored by MINURCAT. 
Will Chad be able to provide necessary security 
and take on the wider responsibility of protection, 
to prevent relapse into conflict and, most crucial-
ly, enable IDPs to return? On the whole, the new 
mandate would seem to be a bad deal for the in-
ternational community. It will continue to finance 
MINURCAT with 1900 troops in Chad who mostly 
stay in their camps and civilian sections without 
access to IDP returnee areas, due to the limited ca-
pacity for escorts and patrols of the host govern-
ment. There is a high risk that eastern Chad, which 
was on its way to early recovery, may again become 
a humanitarian crisis. The key benchmark – the re-
turn of a critical mass of IDPs – had been within 
striking distance. It now seems an elusive goal.
While the enduring conflict in Darfur has received 
extensive international attention, the conflicts and 
political crisis in neighbouring Chad have attracted 
far less notice. Since 2005, however, it has become 
evident that the government in Sudan and Chad have 
been fighting proxy wars and backing opposing rebel 
groups in each other’s countries. Refugees from Dar-
fur have sought protection in neighbouring Chad, and 
the internal turmoil in Chad has caused an increase 
in the number of internally displaced persons (IDPs). 
MINURCAT was deployed together with a European 
force (EUFOR) in 2008. In March 2009, MINURCAT 
also took on responsibility for the military component. 
The mission has been ridden with slow deployment 
of troops and construction of infrastructure, but has 
managed to improve the security situation to some de-
gree. By the end of 2009, MINURCAT had achieved 
acceptable levels of deployment and could show rea-
sonably good results – not only in the area of security, 
but also in support to strengthening the justice and 
corrective system, local administration, gender sen-
sitivity, intercommunity dialogue and human rights. 
In all, an estimated 249,242 refugees from Sudan 
and 62,019 from the Central African Republic are 
living in eastern Chad, and a further 168,000 Chad-
ians have been displaced. The international commu-
nity is providing assistance to approximately 150,000 
people in host communities.1 During 2008/09, an 
initial return of approximately 20,000 IDPs was wit-
nessed. The UN expected that a much larger return 
would take place in the course of 2010 as the mis-
1 All figures are from UN (2010) S/2010/217: Report of the 
Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in the Central 
African Republic and in Chad (MINURCAT), 29 April 2010, 
United Nations, New York.
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sion became fully deployed in the field and could bet-
ter provide area security, and escorts where needed. 
Integral part to the provision of security has been the 
850-strong Chadian police/gendarme force, Détach-
ment Intégré de Securité (DIS), trained and mentored 
by MINURCAT. The DIS are deployed to maintain 
law and order in refugee and IDP camps and key 
towns in neighbouring areas within a 10 km radius, 
as well as securing humanitarian activities and main-
taining the humanitarian space in eastern Chad to-
gether with the MINURCAT Force. The significant 
number of female officers in the DIS represents a 
positive development. These female officers have 
made significant contributions to reaching civilian 
women who would otherwise not initiate direct con-
tact with male officers. That in turn means improved 
access for female victims to report sensitive cases in-
volving sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV). 
Notwithstanding the important advances, the Chadian 
government, weary of repeated promises of construc-
tion of airport aprons and hard-wall commissariats for 
the DIS, early this year asked the mission to leave. Presi-
dent Déby announced that the mission had been a fail-
ure, unable to fulfil its promises, and that the Govern-
ment of Chad was ready to take over responsibility for 
the security of refugees, IDPs and humanitarian work-
ers. The government wants to increase the DIS from 
850 to 1000, but also deploying to Daha and Haraze in 
southeastern Chad, and Gore and Danamadji in south-
ern Chad. Thus, although the DIS may be increased in 
numbers, capacity in the east will remain the same. 
UNSC Resolution 1926 of 26 May 2010 outlines 
how Chad will assume responsibility for the protec-
tion of civilians. Indeed, the commitment that Chad 
is showing through the detailed plan is unprece-
dented. The Government of Chad has committed to:
(i) ensure the security and protection of civilians in 
danger, particularly refugees and internally dis-
placed persons; 
(ii) facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid and the 
free movement of humanitarian personnel by 
improving security in eastern Chad; 
(iii) ensure the security and freedom of movement of 
MINURCAT staff and United Nations and associ-
ated personnel.
This is a laudable step on the part of the Chadian govern-
ment. There have been far too many instances where 
host governments feel no obligation to present their 
plans for the protection of civilians to the international 
community. However, the extent of the tasks given to 
the DIS is worrisome: ‘… to provide security inside and 
around refugee camps and IDP sites, security escorts 
and area security, in coordination with the Gendarme-
rie and the Nomad Guard.’ Firstly, this expands the 
area of DIS operations from refugee camps to include 
IDP sites in general. Secondly, it gives the DIS respon-
sibility for area security as well, in coordination with 
the Gendarmerie and the Garde Nationale et Nomade du 
Tchad (GNNT) – who are sorely lacking in capacity and 
are ill-informed as to how to execute a protection man-
date. While the plan is praiseworthy, what is less clear 
is whether it is realistic. Lacking are arrangements for 
how the other protection measures, such as strength-
ening of the judicial apparatus, human rights moni-
toring and intercommunity dialogue efforts – current-
ly undertaken by MINURCAT should be transferred 
to the Government of Chad, UN agencies and NGOs. 
The resolution stipulates the establishment of a High-
Level Working Group composed of members from the 
United Nations and Chad, to assess progress towards 
implementation of the mandate and to deal with any 
issues that may arise. This group should be set up im-
mediately. The resolution also welcomes the intention 
to establish a forum to foster dialogue and collaboration 
to reach a common understanding on roles and respon-
sibilities in issues of protection of civilians, humani-
tarian access, and safety and security arrangements 
for humanitarian-sector actors. Participation by the 
humanitarian sector will be crucial here, as the forum 
will be very important for operationalising the mandate 
around commonly understood goals and methods.
The DIS – key to security sector reform, or highly 
trained and equipped bandits?
An uneasy feeling prevails in the humanitarian sec-
tor in Chad and among many of those working for 
MINURCAT. They are sceptical of whether the Gov-
ernment of Chad has the capacity to assume full re-
sponsibility for the protection of civilians in all its 
facets. ‘The DIS is on life-support and will collapse 
the day MINURCAT leaves’, was one representative 
opinion encountered. It was argued that the Gov-
ernment of Chad will be neither able nor willing to 
keep the vehicles operating, fuel in the tanks, and all 
the other operational costs associated with the DIS. 
The DIS has in many ways become an elite force. Its 
members have performed their job reasonably well, 
which is very positive; but they stand apart. The ac-
cess to material resources and the benefits they re-
ceive are unmatched by any other existing security 
force in Chad, and envy has been strong. Several 
attacks – seven of them lethal – against the DIS by 
both official and non-official armed elements in 
Chad underscore this point. During such incidents, 
MINURCAT has provided both physical and medi-
cal support, in turn boosting the moral commitment 
within the DIS to continue its work. Some thus fear 
that the DIS may splinter into its constituent parts 
when MINURCAT leaves, and that the spoils will be 
shared – in a worst case scenario the DIS could be-
come a force of ‘highly trained and equipped bandits’. 
Conversely, there is hope that the DIS could provide 
3the seed for a wider Security Sector Reform (SSR) in 
Chad. The DIS today has trainers with capacity to carry 
on the training of new staff. But this capacity transfor-
mation from MINURCAT to the DIS cannot remain 
viable if there are no incentives to continue the risky 
job of protecting vulnerable populations and secur-
ing humanitarian space. Inevitably, any SSR initiative 
would require further funding from the international 
community – particularly its main donor, the Euro-
pean Union – and adjusting the support to sustain-
able levels reasonable for a scalable SSR programme. 
However, the EU and other donors are understandably 
reluctant to provide funding to one of countries that 
ranks lowest on the Transparency International Cor-
ruption Perceptions Index (175 out of 180 in 2009). 
Improved relations with Sudan, distancing from JEM
Undoubtedly, the regional situation has changed. 
Chad has established a joint border force with Sudan; 
three border crossings have been opened for com-
merce; and the number of security incidents has de-
creased drastically. This is due in part to the improved 
control of the previously extremely porous border, 
and to informal intelligence-sharing between Sudan 
and Chad. The result has been a dramatic reduction 
in cross-border banditry activities. The re-establish-
ment of diplomatic relations between N’Djamena 
and Khartoum also shows a commitment towards 
peace and stability between the two neighbours. On 
27 May, President Déby of Chad attended the inaugu-
ration of the re-elected President Al-Bashir of Sudan. 
Chad also seems to be fulfilling its promise to Sudan 
with regard to the rebel Justice and Equality Movement 
(JEM). Chad have taken a much tougher stance in the 
refugee camps in the north, considered to be JEM 
strongholds, and routinely perform weapons search-
es. Today, armed JEM elements are rarely seen in the 
camps or on the Chadian side of the border. On 19 
May, JEM leader Khalil Ibrahim, formerly a frequent 
(albeit informal) visitor and even resident in Chad, 
was refused entry at N’Djamena International Airport.
From humanitarian response to early recovery?
The focus now should be on re-gearing support towards 
early recovery activities. While the initial response had 
to tackle the humanitarian crisis sparked by the fight-
ing in Darfur and intercommunity conflict in eastern 
Chad, the task now should be to make it possible for 
IDPs to return. Unfortunately, the exit of MINURCAT 
is likely to provide an impetus in the opposite direc-
tion. In the Assoungha region, the MINURCAT Force 
stopped escorting humanitarians, UN agencies and 
MINURCAT civilian officers immediately after UNSC 
Res. 1923 was passed. Left to do the job are 119 DIS 
elements with only seven vehicles at their disposal. 
That will jeopardise the frail gains made so far in 
terms of intercommunity dialogue and conflict reso-
lution; human rights and SGBV monitoring; sup-
port to capacity development for local administra-
tors; strengthening of justice and other key activities. 
Protection is more than physical protection. Tremen-
dously important is the emphasis on community dia-
logue encouraging more equal and sustainable shar-
ing of land, water and other valuable resources. Cases 
of SGBV, armed attacks and other reported incidents 
are often rooted in disputes over scarce resources and 
envy of refugees who seem to receive more support 
than the host community. Among the success sto-
ries have been initiatives such as drilling water wells 
combined with a strengthening of the local admin-
istration to dialogue and sharing of wells as in Iriba. 
Some further points to note: It is likely that the 
number of attacks and security incidents will remain 
low. This will be a consequence of the improved bor-
der control limiting cross-border banditry; strict rules 
imposed on the humanitarian community, UN agen-
cies and MINURCAT civilian staff to use escorts at 
all times in designated areas (despite promises of 
free movement in UNSC Res. 1923); and the new 
protection model implemented by the Government 
of Chad. Taking into account the lack of means, this 
seems certain to result in at least a temporary sharp 
drop in protection activities for the humanitarian 
sector, UN agencies and MINURCAT civilian sec-
tions alike. Humanitarian considerations and ac-
tivities will take priority, whereas the essential re-
focusing on the return of IDPs, strengthening local 
administration, rule of law, human rights and other 
early recovery activities will suffer and be further post-
poned. Furthermore, we must never forget that long-
term civilian protection requires a political solution. 
A key task should be to further strengthen and im-
prove the responsiveness and capacity of local ad-
ministration to adjudicate conflicts in a fair manner. 
Moreover, the local administration should be sup-
ported and made responsible for providing basic so-
cial services that in turn can create the foundation for 
long-term development in eastern Chad. The positive 
initiatives by the Chadian government towards peace 
in the region should be welcomed by the remaining 
UN agencies and the international actors present in 
the country. Further support for capacity develop-
ment is needed for civil society, including women’s 
organizations for peace and political participation. 
Only by addressing poverty, developing state capaci-
ties, extending basic services and supporting income-
generating efforts can a sustainable foundation be 
established for long-term peace and development. 
An honourable exit? 
There is little that Chad and the internation-
al community can do to change the predicted 
drop of humanitarian and early recovery activi-
ties in the short term, but some steps can be taken:
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1. Press the Government of Chad for a detailed plan 
for the provision of area security, sector by sec-
tor (in addition to an increase in escort capacity), 
as well as other forms of protection measures.
2. Put equal pressure on MINURCAT, UN agen-
cies, and the Government of Chad, to present, 
without further delay, their handover plan of 
MINURCAT tasks, including the activities un-
dertaken by all civilian sections, such as human 
rights, justice, corrections, political and civil af-
fairs, gender, and mine action. Essential here 
will be the early recovery activities led by UNDP. 
3. Immediately start a close dialogue between the 
UN Department for Safety and Security (DSS) and 
the Government of Chad to agree on local-level 
security classification of zones in eastern Chad. 
This can make it easier to focus on areas where 
the need is greatest, thus increasing escort and 
patrol capacity of DIS, Gendarmerie and GNNT.
4. Urgent establishment of the High-Level Work-
ing Group and the Forum for dialogue on the 
protection of civilians, humanitarian access, 
safety and security arrangements, to ensure com-
mon understanding among all parties about 
roles and responsibilities, with special emphasis 
on the inclusion of humanitarian-sector actors.
5. Develop an SSR programme for Chad, including 
demilitarization of camps, in close cooperation with 
the Government of Chad, the EU and UN agencies.
6. Urgent deployment of staff by UN agencies to 
eastern Chad, to ensure the handover of key tasks. 
7. Resource mobilization for UN agencies, to en-
able them to implement an early recovery pro-
gramme for eastern Chad. An Early Recovery 
Donor Roundtable should be held in the third 
quarter of 2010. Here it should be noted that the 
Judicial Affairs and Corrections units of MINUR-
CAT could be transferred in its entirety to UNDP.
